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But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“family	 ﾠfarm,”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠits	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠ
assumptions,	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠaround	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
food	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠare	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollected.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
increasingly	 ﾠobsolete	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠ
sector.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠguided	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠduring	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1920s	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ1930s.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
vaguely	 ﾠresembles	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevailed	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Bonnen	 ﾠ1977,	 ﾠp.387	 ﾠ
Agricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
desired	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠunit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjective.	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠintervention,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
definition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
trapped	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠolder	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimpler	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠCertainly	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠ
shorthand	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠFarms	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠengage	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠnegotiated	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ
standards.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠA	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farmland	 ﾠis	 ﾠowned	 ﾠby	 ﾠparties	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠnow	 ﾠderive	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠportion,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority,	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠanother	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠSociety	 ﾠnow	 ﾠexpects	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠReconciling	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠheterogeneous	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠinterchangeably,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
places	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠ“firm/farm”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠpurposes.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠProfessor,	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgricultural	 ﾠEconomics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠKentucky.	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠ
developed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠAAFC-ﾭ‐USDA	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠon	 ﾠComplex	 ﾠFarming	 ﾠSystems,	 ﾠNiagara-ﾭ‐On-ﾭ‐
The-ﾭ‐Lake,	 ﾠOntario,	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ27-ﾭ‐28,	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠUseful	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠSimon	 ﾠJette-ﾭ‐Nantel	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠgratefully	 ﾠacknowledged.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠare	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstrued	 ﾠas	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthor’s	 ﾠemployer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
Jim	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠamused,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsurprised,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrust	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠdéjà	 ﾠvu	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquote	 ﾠabove	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
starting	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠis	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠas	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠ
emphasized,	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
readdress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠto	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1970s,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpresidential	 ﾠ
address	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠAgricultural	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠAssociation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠ
economists	 ﾠshould	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠspend	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠtime	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠon	 ﾠdata	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ(Bonnen,	 ﾠ1975).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠBonnen’s	 ﾠadmonition	 ﾠGardner	 ﾠ
identifies	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠundesirable	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ“really	 ﾠdescribes”	 ﾠ(Gardner,	 ﾠ1992).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠGardner	 ﾠ
reviews	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbenefitted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠand	 ﾠdefined.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Data	 ﾠand	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠ
Data	 ﾠare	 ﾠan	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠstage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠPreceding	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠand	 ﾠreality.	 ﾠFollowing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
analysis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠstages	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcollectively	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠpackage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
creates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠdesign,	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠand	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠ
1).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquote	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm/firm	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinappropriate.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠobsolete	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠis	 ﾠsmall.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
step	 ﾠin	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠtoday,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s,	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠkey	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠabout	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
obsolescence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Conceptual	 ﾠobsolescence	 ﾠin	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠand	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠ
industry,	 ﾠas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠdescribed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagenda	 ﾠof	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠ(public	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate)	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠdrastically,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠalways	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠbase	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcollected.	 ﾠ
Bonnen,	 ﾠ1977	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ388	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠobsolescence	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠCertainly,	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠforty	 ﾠyears	 ﾠago	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠsystematic	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
deficiencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠeconomics	 ﾠprofession.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
misleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠdata	 ﾠdeficiencies	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠsample	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠ
obsolescence,	 ﾠso	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbig	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarmers?	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
them.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠtwenty	 ﾠyears	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠreorientation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠaway	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠa	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠprice	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farming
3.	 ﾠA	 ﾠclear	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhole-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠbased,	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
focused	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠvery	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ(Freshwater,	 ﾠ2007a).	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠjust	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfits	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠdependent.	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠFarm	 ﾠStructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠFarm	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠschematic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
policy
4.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠare	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠcoupled	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠCertainly,	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeparture	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠtrend.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠMoyers	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ38-ﾭ‐42).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠ
incorporates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors’	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠdrivers	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠ
change.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforces	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠsuggests.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
determined.	 ﾠFarmers	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
influences	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠa	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠ
favor	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠor	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠby	 ﾠconstraining	 ﾠfarmers’	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠby:	 ﾠrestricting	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠ
practices,	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐compliance	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠor	 ﾠspecifying	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠquality	 ﾠstandards.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadjustments	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠevolve	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠway,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠcontinuously	 ﾠadapting	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠsignals.	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠ	 ﾠevolves	 ﾠin	 ﾠjumps,	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtectonic	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeology.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
economics	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠ(Anderson,	 ﾠ1998;	 ﾠ
Coleman,	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠFriedman,	 ﾠ1999;	 ﾠRauser,	 ﾠ1992).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠstability	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠif	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠadjustments.	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punctuated	 ﾠby	 ﾠperiodic	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐marginal	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regime	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠevolves	 ﾠ(Coleman,	 ﾠSkogstad	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Anderson,	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠKuhn’s	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
science,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconflicting	 ﾠparadigms	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
dominance	 ﾠ(Kuhn,	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalso	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregime	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠ
identify	 ﾠfive	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ39-ﾭ‐43).	 ﾠThese	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpressures.	 ﾠExternal	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
liberalization	 ﾠare	 ﾠwell	 ﾠknown.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠkey	 ﾠelements	 ﾠMoyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠare	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠregional	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠblocs	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
broad	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐lateral	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠinterestingly,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠbackground,	 ﾠMoyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠthan	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcausing	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ39).	 ﾠThey	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠkey	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠforces:	 ﾠ
1.  An	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠimbalance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠin	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠ
policies	 ﾠat	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠ
2.  Major	 ﾠrestructuring	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchains	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠ
functional	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠand	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠdifferentiation,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
bulk	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠundesirable	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠvolatile	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠrestrictions,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.  Growing	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenvironmentally	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠsafe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwater,	 ﾠ
soil	 ﾠor	 ﾠwildlife.	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ38-ﾭ‐39)	 ﾠ
Moyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠignore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠforces	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
linking	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠwith	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠparadigm	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠMoyer	 ﾠand	 ﾠJosling	 ﾠ
recognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠleave	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
micro	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds,	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠcould	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠof	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠ	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Agricultural	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠas	 ﾠevolving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpressures.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠis	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠand	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarmers.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto:	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠ
produced,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠsense	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠinputs,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠpurchased	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐supplied.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
evolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcoordinates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠcommodities.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠtransformation	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐market	 ﾠ
coordination	 ﾠforces	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠintegration,	 ﾠcontracting	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐arms	 ﾠ
length	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠexchanges.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlabor,	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠland.	 ﾠIncreased	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠled	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠto	 ﾠabandon	 ﾠfarming,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnow	 ﾠit	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠmixing	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtraditionally	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
enterprise	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfist	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠon	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠas	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwas.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠland	 ﾠhas	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠconversion	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠuses,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐commodity	 ﾠoutputs,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwildlife	 ﾠhabitat	 ﾠon	 ﾠrecreation	 ﾠamenities.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠadapt	 ﾠits	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠand	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
sets	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠchange	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠremain	 ﾠrelevant.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschematic	 ﾠof	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠroles.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠevolving	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠchange	 ﾠis	 ﾠgreat.	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠregimes/paradigms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbe	 ﾠguided	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsound	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠon	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠperformance.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠof	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof:	 ﾠdata	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠ
indicators,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome;	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction;	 ﾠand	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠ
compliance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠwater	 ﾠquality,	 ﾠsoil	 ﾠerosion	 ﾠand	 ﾠnitrogen	 ﾠrun-ﾭ‐off.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdata	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠongoing,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠutility	 ﾠmay	 ﾠdeteriorate	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠComplexity	 ﾠEntail?	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
(anonymous,	 ﾠp.2).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠse.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
capturing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠassuming	 ﾠ
parametric	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠare	 ﾠmarketed	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
produced	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcollect.	 ﾠ	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Essentially	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠparametric	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm/farm,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
repeated	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠspot	 ﾠ
market.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthree	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠto	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠso	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproducers,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcommodities.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠPrices	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠrewards	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠpast	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠChanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠprices	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistorted	 ﾠthen	 ﾠresource	 ﾠmisallocation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
observed	 ﾠprices	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠexchange,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransactions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠprices	 ﾠas	 ﾠsignals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠaction	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpeded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdata	 ﾠby	 ﾠrefining	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠand	 ﾠsample	 ﾠframes	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfall	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
papers	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcracks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠask	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhappened	 ﾠand	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
underpin	 ﾠour	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠmethods,	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠvalid.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarming,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthen	 ﾠmove	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠgo	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcomplicating	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlongstanding	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠ
leads	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠdata	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠ(aggregate	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠand	 ﾠprices	 ﾠby	 ﾠcommodity,	 ﾠstocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠplanting	 ﾠdecisions,	 ﾠexports	 ﾠand	 ﾠimports)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfamilies	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠ
sources	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠ
decoupled	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdata	 ﾠstreams.	 ﾠKnowing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠnow	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
little	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds,	 ﾠand	 ﾠvice	 ﾠversa,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
output.	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthis	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠ(anonymous),	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠby	 ﾠBlandford;	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠJohnson,	 ﾠ
Morehart,	 ﾠCulver,	 ﾠPoppe	 ﾠand	 ﾠSalvioni,	 ﾠare	 ﾠactually	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠof:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
farms,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠare	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobjectives,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy?	 ﾠThese	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstrumental,	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracts,	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠtenure	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠoutputs,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠoutputs.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ
Fundamentally,	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠreacting	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠconstraints
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 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠconstructing	 ﾠnew	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠNature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFarm	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm?	 ﾠTypical	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠsale	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
commodities.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhas	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
minimum	 ﾠsales	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠ(Statistics	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠone	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprise,	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠattribute.	 ﾠAllen	 ﾠand	 ﾠLueck	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠby	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnexus	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠ(1998;	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠtheories	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
shifted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠorganizes	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ(Barry,	 ﾠSonka	 ﾠand	 ﾠLajli,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ1221;	 ﾠKroszner	 ﾠand	 ﾠPutterman,	 ﾠp.7;	 ﾠYou,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ442).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠCoase’s	 ﾠ
theory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhe	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmake	 ﾠversus	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠ(Coase,	 ﾠ1937).	 ﾠ
Coase	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠthose	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠit	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠpurchases	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠvendor.	 ﾠVarious	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠand	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠstill	 ﾠremains	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
production,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠassembles	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
needs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproduction,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠOver	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
farming	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠwere	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
purchased.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠversus	 ﾠpurchase”	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠconsiderably.	 ﾠ
Mechanization	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠtraction,	 ﾠsynthetic	 ﾠfertilizer	 ﾠand	 ﾠpesticides	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠ
available,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠseed	 ﾠand	 ﾠreplacement	 ﾠlivestock	 ﾠexternally	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠusing	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠ(Cochrane,	 ﾠ1993;	 ﾠMundlak,	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Part	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠspecialization	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠ(Dimitri	 ﾠ,Effland	 ﾠand	 ﾠConklin,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproducer	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠfood	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchain	 ﾠ(Barry,	 ﾠSonka,	 ﾠ
Lajli).	 ﾠFar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠare	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠgate	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecialization.	 ﾠ
Allen	 ﾠand	 ﾠLueck	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreview	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠand	 ﾠuse	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbased	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1800	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠ
(2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠContracts	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthey	 ﾠextend	 ﾠCoase’s	 ﾠmake	 ﾠversus	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠway.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaker	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
geographical	 ﾠspace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
observed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠexchange.	 ﾠContracts	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠidealized	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠof	 ﾠperfect	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠ(MacDonald	 ﾠet.	 ﾠal.).	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠby	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠthan	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontracting,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠproprietary	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
farm/firm.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Just	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchains,	 ﾠso	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠrural	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠrural	 ﾠareas	 ﾠand	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠ
labor,	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠland,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlow	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠSpatial	 ﾠisolation	 ﾠmade	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠurban	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime	 ﾠconsuming,	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠnonfarm	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠrural	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠland	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“full	 ﾠtime”	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevalence	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠamong	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ
classes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ(Jette-ﾭ‐Nantel	 ﾠet.	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠOff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
main	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠaverage.	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠraised	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincomes,	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ(Freshwater	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Jette-ﾭ‐Nantel,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠa	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsources	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠ
uncorrelated,	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠreturns,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
convince	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“top	 ﾠload”	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠ.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠvariability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠas	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠ
increased,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠis	 ﾠimproved.	 ﾠ
Who	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFarmers?	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠ
had	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠinterwoven	 ﾠthemes.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
theme	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfamily.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaltered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠare	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠchallenging.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠdo?	 ﾠIs	 ﾠit	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implication	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠ“nexus	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracts”	 ﾠperspectives	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠor	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
engagement	 ﾠin	 ﾠactual	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠimportant?	 ﾠIs	 ﾠa	 ﾠland-ﾭ‐owner	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
engages	 ﾠin	 ﾠshare-ﾭ‐contracts	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperator?	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠincidental	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠowner	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperator?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
vertically	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“farmer”	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐	 ﾠmaking,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperson	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperator?	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐commodity	 ﾠoutputs,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠwe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
address	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being?	 ﾠSince	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ
better-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠhousehold,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠobsolete?	 ﾠ
But,	 ﾠif	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠperception	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠ
risky	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠown,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠgather	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠassess	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠdo	 ﾠface	 ﾠexcessive	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠsurely,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
concern	 ﾠhow	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcommodities.	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠportfolios	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠincomes.	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinconsequential	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠwealth.	 ﾠOr,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
portfolio	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠportfolios	 ﾠis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operator/owner,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠassess	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Getting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠSimple	 ﾠfarm/firm	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠ
models	 ﾠunderpin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐
time	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefinition,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠcosts;	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorporation;	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠand	 ﾠparametric	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠsimplistic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Complexity,	 ﾠStructural	 ﾠChange	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠObjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgricultural	 ﾠPolicy?	 ﾠ
Changes	 ﾠin	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠhave	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠ
Farms	 ﾠnow	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof:	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠpurchased,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠand	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠproduced,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠare	 ﾠmarketed.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
minimum	 ﾠthis	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠmeaningfully	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
industry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmore	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠ(Blandford,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
31).	 ﾠHistorically	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
proportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠany	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠflows	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
production,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeffective?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgross	 ﾠ
margin	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠ
diverse	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠraises	 ﾠother	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠconcerns;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfarms/firms	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
producers	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfamilies	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
production.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinstituted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠ
perspectives,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwere	 ﾠof	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠuniform	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠproduced.	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
produced	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠcommodities
6.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠbenefitted	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠevenly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠprovided.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdual	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
emphasized	 ﾠby	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1972	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠreform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠ
agricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠshift	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
support,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠand	 ﾠnoncommercial	 ﾠfarmers.	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsense	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠ
emphasize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstabilization	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
stabilization	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠhas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠ
cycles,	 ﾠweather	 ﾠvariation,	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠfluctuations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon.	 ﾠHowever	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠprice	 ﾠstability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsought,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstability.”	 ﾠ(Crown	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Heady,	 ﾠp108).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠenvisioned	 ﾠan	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠof	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐commercial	 ﾠ
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6	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhad	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠdifferences.	 ﾠ
Western	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeared	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitating	 ﾠ
exports	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠincomes,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠraised	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠby	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(Drummond,	 ﾠ
Anderson	 ﾠand	 ﾠKerr,	 ﾠ1966).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ109).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠof	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalytical	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠ
Crown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠassume	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠit	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐commercial	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠshould,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠdisappear.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdidn’t,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbegs	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠnot?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsensible	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠunderpinning	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠwere	 ﾠincorrect,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠflawed.	 ﾠ
Commercial	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠby	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
utility	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠand	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximizing	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
forecast	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠa	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
today.	 ﾠComplexities	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠhave	 ﾠonly	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠhas	 ﾠevolved	 ﾠform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
simple	 ﾠdual	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
heterogeneous.	 ﾠReturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠBonnen,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠneed	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts.	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠmay	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐commercial	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠignored	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrown	 ﾠand	 ﾠHeady	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠrebuttals	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠexist.	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠor	 ﾠclean	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommercial.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠcriterion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
essentially	 ﾠarbitrary	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
qualifies	 ﾠas	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeaningfully	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
qualify.	 ﾠ
Second,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrather	 ﾠsmall.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
perspective	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaximizes	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmaximizes	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠnumbers.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠallows	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠexpenditure	 ﾠper	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠmore	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ
citizen	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdenominator	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtwenty	 ﾠpercent,	 ﾠor	 ﾠless,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠ
Third,	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmland	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠoutput,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠas	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
commodity	 ﾠconcerns.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠin	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠ
agri-ﾭ‐environmental	 ﾠtargets,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfor	 ﾠamenity	 ﾠand	 ﾠhabitat	 ﾠobjectives,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthey:	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠmonoculture,	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
employ	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠmethods,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠon	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠ
land,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠimpact.	 ﾠ
Fourth,	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠless	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠfit	 ﾠneatly	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximizing	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm/farm.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠas	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
simple	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximizing	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠis	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠ
Fifth,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠanother	 ﾠfocus.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠredefined	 ﾠto	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠask,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠneed	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeligible	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠsupport?	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
complex,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfamily-ﾭ‐size	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarchetype	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠbehaviorally	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
maximizing	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprise,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
income.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠrely	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠon	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
family	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠare	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
enterprises	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ“all	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeggs	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠbasket”.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
meaningful	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠand	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠdiverge	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠin	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠways,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthem	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠare	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠconcepts.	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ4	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠ
maximization	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠcomplexity.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreflects,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
contracts,	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠownership	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
functions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠcarrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠinternally.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
complexity	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠarises	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠ
maximization.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠlabor,	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠland,	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠ
Over	 ﾠtime	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠcommodities.	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠflat	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
symmetric	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠsize	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput,	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
commodity	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠamong	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠ
Further,	 ﾠif	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠare	 ﾠbroadened	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠagri-ﾭ‐environmental	 ﾠoutcomes,	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠbase	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmore	 ﾠamenable	 ﾠto	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠnoncommodity	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠand	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠon	 ﾠland	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenvironmentally	 ﾠfragile	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
amenity	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwentieth	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
dominated	 ﾠby	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠsize	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠterm	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠheld	 ﾠto	 ﾠcover	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold:	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠlives	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠand	 ﾠintends	 ﾠto	 ﾠpass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠ
generations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
sufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠliving	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠan	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐going	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ
Large	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠare	 ﾠimprecise	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$50,000	 ﾠin	 ﾠsales	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠsmall,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$1	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠcash	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠare	 ﾠlarge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figures	 ﾠ5	 ﾠand	 ﾠ6	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠusing	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclasses,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠdeflator	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
adjustment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinterval,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdeclined,	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ50%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠphysically	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠland	 ﾠbase	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeclining,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ	 ﾠas	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠdecrease.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnow	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠof	 ﾠsales.	 ﾠ
Moreover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ35	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
45%	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠperiods.	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠnet	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐$3,206	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1986	 ﾠto	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐$5,119	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠ
By	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠremain	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ
doubled	 ﾠin	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjust	 ﾠover	 ﾠ2.5%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠnow	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠjust	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ40%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠcash	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠon	 ﾠjust	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfarmland.	 ﾠClearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠis	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠfaster	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
numbers	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠland	 ﾠbase.	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠ83%	 ﾠand	 ﾠ92%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠreported	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
net	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠincome	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$211,845	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1986	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$379,035	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2006.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠdeclined	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ293,000	 ﾠto	 ﾠ229,000	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1986	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsales	 ﾠdistribution,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
conservative	 ﾠdefinitions	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠsize	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
grown	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠterms	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollectively	 ﾠnow	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ55%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
farms.	 ﾠClearly	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmotivates	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$50,000	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpersist	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
twenty	 ﾠyear	 ﾠinterval.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdoubled	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsolute	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategory,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
inflation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠComplexity	 ﾠ
Clearly	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠheterogeneous	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠalone	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
complexity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠas	 ﾠoutliers	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠminor	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠ
possible.	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠclear	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
speak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠindustry”	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠway.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
variety	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjectives,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchain	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠit	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠgate.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠby	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠtask	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠfour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
influences	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremainder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠand	 ﾠredefined	 ﾠmust	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcollected.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
changed	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠlabor,	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠland	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠenterprise.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠto	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠopportunities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠevolving	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠ
chains.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠand	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠit	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠgood	 ﾠinformation.	 ﾠ
New	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠGoals	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠGrowing	 ﾠForward,	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠ
mentions	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
categories	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠare:	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠinnovative	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsector	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
contributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠsociety’s	 ﾠpriorities	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠsector	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠproactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠLooking	 ﾠ
below	 ﾠthese	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠstatements	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠwith:	 ﾠfood	 ﾠsafety,	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠ
protection,	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠand	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠaccess.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠlink	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠ“farm	 ﾠproblem”	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Business	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ(BRM)	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠnow	 ﾠextends	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ(Skogstad,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠFood	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠelement	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
word	 ﾠ“Agri-ﾭ‐Food“	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠsuggests.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠ
impacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠAAFC’s	 ﾠresponsibilities.	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠnow	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠforward	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbackward	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠand	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠnarrowly	 ﾠ
defined	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠ
BRM	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigating	 ﾠ
risk.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠshift	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠfully	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠowners	 ﾠand	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠenterprise.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
management,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠowners	 ﾠis	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠfits	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsources	 ﾠand	 ﾠassets	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
corporation,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsound	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ
portfolio.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Beyond	 ﾠBRM,	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwell	 ﾠother	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠare	 ﾠmet	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠ
major	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgo	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
statistics.	 ﾠAssessing	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠon	 ﾠsoil	 ﾠwater	 ﾠand	 ﾠhabitat	 ﾠquality.	 ﾠFood	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠtraceability.	 ﾠ
Regulatory	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon.	 ﾠ
Returning	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdata	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
supports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠin	 ﾠGrowing	 ﾠForward	 ﾠare	 ﾠcouched	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠ
sector”	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcovers.	 ﾠClearly	 ﾠit	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhow	 ﾠfar?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠstatements	 ﾠare	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠis	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
competitiveness	 ﾠare	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠimportant?	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠGrowing	 ﾠForward	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠscience	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
innovation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠimpacts,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠon	 ﾠother	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠDecision-ﾭ‐Makers	 ﾠObjectives	 ﾠ
Ultimately	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠis	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
objectives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠlocus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠthe	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠPlausible	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠmight	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
1.  Maximize	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠ
2.  Maximize	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpreserving	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchain	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠ
3.  Maximize	 ﾠholding	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠ(farm	 ﾠis	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠownership)	 ﾠ
4.  Maximize	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠutility	 ﾠ
5.  Maximize	 ﾠtax	 ﾠshield	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ
6.  Maximize	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term,	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐generational	 ﾠviability	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Beyond	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠobjectives,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
constraints.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠincomplete	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠand	 ﾠasymmetric	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
constraints	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠvary	 ﾠconsiderably.	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠeither	 ﾠalters	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
modifies	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠ
important.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠimproves	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠif	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
sales	 ﾠof	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$10,000	 ﾠare	 ﾠexcluded,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠof	 ﾠsales	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpenses.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
characterizes	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠof	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$100,000.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠtruncation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠappropriate.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠextend	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠ
output	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠharder	 ﾠto	 ﾠrationalize	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
households	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠconsideration.	 ﾠ
Diversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠLarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠentities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift	 ﾠprofits.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠentities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠsubsidiaries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
allocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠand	 ﾠlabor.	 ﾠMany	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠextent.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠof	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$1	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠsales	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
66%	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠreported	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠwage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsalary	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ($54,145	 ﾠper	 ﾠ
reporting	 ﾠoperator),	 ﾠand	 ﾠ9%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass	 ﾠreported	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
employment	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ($26,999	 ﾠper	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠoperator).	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠnet	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ$103,171,	 ﾠso	 ﾠif	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠearned	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠalso	 ﾠearned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ75	 ﾠ%	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠin	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠOrganization	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠis	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠowner,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
operates.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠ
contracts,	 ﾠbarter	 ﾠand	 ﾠreciprocity.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbut	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
forms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ(Freshwater	 ﾠand	 ﾠReimer).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
expect	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠUS	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
purchase	 ﾠof	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠbenefit,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠemployer	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ
health	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠfamily.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Vertical	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠchains	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠas	 ﾠprocessors	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠbrand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
products	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠprices	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
timing	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpurchases.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠstricter	 ﾠquality	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠprecise	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠschedules	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠcan	 ﾠvary	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠamong	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpaired	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarmers.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠdisplace	 ﾠspot	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠprices	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
methods	 ﾠdeclines.	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐investigated	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtax	 ﾠcode	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
decisions.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠforms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
advantageous.	 ﾠIncorporating	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠ
requirements	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠestate	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
family	 ﾠlabor,	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠCorporations	 ﾠare	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠinvestors.	 ﾠTypically	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠreturns,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠowned	 ﾠby	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
organizations.	 ﾠCorporate	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠby	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠform	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$1	 ﾠmillion.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcases	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ(13.5%)	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠ
held.	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐family	 ﾠcorporations	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠ11%	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$1	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠ
million	 ﾠin	 ﾠsales	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐family	 ﾠcorporations	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ31%	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
sales	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$5	 ﾠmillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠ
Aggregate	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠ
despite	 ﾠit	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠone	 ﾠ	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠflawed	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcomplex.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
overstated.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠas	 ﾠ2004	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠproducer	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠFederation	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgriculture,	 ﾠused	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠreported	 ﾠlow	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠ
net	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠpress	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠreported	 ﾠincome	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠno	 ﾠindication	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcoincident	 ﾠindicators	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠstress,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠforeclosure	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠdowns	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsponsored	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠfunds,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠoutlays	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠexisted	 ﾠ(Freshwater,	 ﾠ
2007b).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstated	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠAAFC.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Canada	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠhas	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠnet	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠover	 ﾠseventy-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠyears	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
starting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdiscussing	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
improving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
understanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwell	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠare	 ﾠdoing,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠBRM	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthose	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠintegration,	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠpricing	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠincome	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠ
prices	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠexchanges	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠan	 ﾠarm’s	 ﾠlength	 ﾠtransaction.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
highly	 ﾠvolatile	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠgross	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpenditures.	 ﾠAggregated	 ﾠincome	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtells	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐sector	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠincome	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠother	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠcrops	 ﾠand	 ﾠlivestock	 ﾠnet	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
consistently	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠcorrelated.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
estimated	 ﾠnet	 ﾠincome	 ﾠper	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠflawed	 ﾠindicator.	 ﾠAverages	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsales	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbehaved,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
heterogeneous	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠan	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠflawed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreported	 ﾠnet	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠunderstates	 ﾠactual	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
(Freshwater,	 ﾠ2007b).	 ﾠ
Differences	 ﾠin	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcloud	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠmetrics.	 ﾠRecent	 ﾠ
calculations	 ﾠby	 ﾠAAFC	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠassets	 ﾠ(ROA)	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠRates	 ﾠof	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠaveraged	 ﾠ6.15%	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$1	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠplus	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2.11%	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ$30,000	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
$250,000.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$250,000	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠROA	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠdouble	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$250,000.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
invariant	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠand	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠacross	 ﾠsize	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
suggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠcould	 ﾠenhance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competitiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpremature.	 ﾠClearly	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠ
below	 ﾠ$100,000	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ
ROA.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠobjective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠmaximization	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshow	 ﾠno	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
abandoning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠpress	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠconsolidation.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠROA	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠLarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofit	 ﾠin	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠROAs	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠconverge	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠduring	 ﾠlow	 ﾠprice	 ﾠintervals.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstabilization	 ﾠprograms,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBRM	 ﾠsuite,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠvariability.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠsize	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprofitability	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠan	 ﾠartifact	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠFurther,	 ﾠif	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠtechnically	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠROA	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠdown-ﾭ‐turns.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Conclusions	 ﾠ
Increasing	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
assess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠunreliable,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠirrelevant.	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠmeasurement	 ﾠof	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠquantities,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
ability	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠrevenues,	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠimpaired.	 ﾠ
Improving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠelements	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconcepts,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠBonnen	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠago.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠ
farm/firm	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠunit	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠunit	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠLarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
behave	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcomplex.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthem	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠmost	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠnow	 ﾠsupports	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠby	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
variability	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠforces,	 ﾠincluding:	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠconflicts,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠpredictability	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutlays	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠweakened	 ﾠ
rationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ(Hedley	 ﾠand	 ﾠFreshwater,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠto	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠare	 ﾠhuge	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠsubjective	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
partially	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariance	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠprices	 ﾠor	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠactually	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠsupplement	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠmechanism,	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdata	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
variability	 ﾠcontributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐makers.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠ
examining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠannual	 ﾠsnapshots.	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
collection	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠGuidance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠof	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
policy.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdomain.	 ﾠPotentially	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$250,000	 ﾠneed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexamined,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ75%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠ
enough	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ17%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ230,000	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠamount	 ﾠif	 ﾠland	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“farming”	 ﾠ	 ﾠto	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ40%	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠland	 ﾠbase.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠramifications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fulfillment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠin	 ﾠGrowing	 ﾠForward.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠleft	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠdefined,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
impossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠhomogeneity	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
rethinking	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdata	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠand	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequired.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠorganizational	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
proposition.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmanagers	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠjob	 ﾠof	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠhow	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠbehave,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
this,	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠ
Small	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠless	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities,	 ﾠplay	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠin	 ﾠresource	 ﾠuse	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠIrrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠits	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠ
impacts,	 ﾠfood	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠconcerns,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠexpand.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠneed	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠricher	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtells	 ﾠus	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthings	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
behaving	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠits	 ﾠperformance.	 ﾠ
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